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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HEIDI METCALF, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V. 
STEVE WALTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 950429-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from a final judgment of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Presiding 
Heidi Metcalf, Appellant 
603 North West Capitol Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
801 359 2833 
Gregory Wall 3365 
Wall & Wall 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801 521 8220 
FILED 
OCT - 2 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HEIDI METCALF, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 950429-CA 
STEVE WALTON, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-appellant herewith makes and files 
her petition for rehearing from the Memorandum 
Decision (Not for Publication) of the Court dated 
and filed September 14, 1995, and with 
particularity state the points of law and fact 
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, as 
follows: 
Argument and authority; 
1. At the pretrial conference on August 31 
1994, the parties did not, as the Court suggests 
in its said memorandum decision "agree[] that 
appellee would be awarded the marital home subject 
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to all debts and obligations." The trial court's 
minute entry was to the effect that for 
plaintiffs one-half interest in the marital home 
she was to receive 11 monthly installments of 
$366.67 from defendant. Plaintiff then received a 
proposed judgment that incorporated this 
provision. Being unaware as to whether the 
proposed decree had been entered or not, plaintiff 
moved to alter or amend the same to in effect 
substitute a provision that the home be sold and 
the proceeds distributed equally between plaintiff 
and defendant. On October 31, 1994, at a hearing 
on plaintiff's motion to alter and amend, the 
trial court ruled that the provision in the 
proposed judgment as to payments for plaintiff's 
one-half interest in the home would not be 
allowed. In the minute entry evidencing the 
action of the trial court at the hearing of 
October 31, 1994, the final statement was ". . . 
All financial issues reserved." On November 14, 
1994, the trial court entered findings, 
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conclusions, and judgment. On its face the 
judgment was final and appealable. The judgment 
did not reserve any issues for future 
consideration but in the recitals it was stated 
that "[a] subsequent hearing was held on October 
31 1994 wherein the action for divorce was 
bifurcated from the remaining issues." It would 
seem to plaintiff that the November 14 1994 
decree, being a final decree, was the result of 
such "bifurcation," if in fact there was one. The 
minutes of the October 31 1994 hearing state "All 
financial issues reserved," nothing is mentioned 
on the matter of bifurcation except in the 
documents that defendant's attorney prepared. And 
isn't equity served by each party retaining his 
one-half interest in the home property? Also, the 
trial court did not "set aside" anything; it 
merely dissallowed the payments from defendant for 
the quit-claim deed from plaintiff. The proposed 
judgment had not been, and was never entered. 
Plaintiff is unaware of any December 30 1994 
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order. But whatever it provided, the part thereof 
quoted in the Court of Appeals' memorandum 
decision "[I]ssues other than the granting of the 
divorce are bifurcated and set aside for separate 
consideration. These include issues *relating to 
property, indebtedness of the parties and such . . 
.'", had no effect on the prior, November 14 1994 
final decree. And plaintiff did not ask the trial 
court to f,set aside" anything; by her motion to 
alter or amend plaintiff objected to the proposed 
judgment which was never entered. In its final 
decree the trial court, it may be assumed, thought 
it equitable that each party retain his or her 
one-half interest in the home which required 
nothing affirmative from the trial court, and 
there were no "financial issues" requiring 
affirmative action of the trial court. Certainly 
it cannot be the case that issues can be inserted 
in a cause after the fact [of a final judgment]. 
The Court of Appeals in its decision states 
the record to be that "[b]y her own motion, 
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appellant set aside the August 31, 1994, 
stipulation of the parties concerning the martital 
residence• This caused the trial judge to 
separate the granting of the divorce from the 
division of property." Plaintiff did not by 
motion "set aside the August 31, 1994 stipulation 
of the parties . . ." What she argued was 
entirely different; with the provision as 
initially formulated in force, plaintiff remained 
tied to the debt on the house which would inhibit 
her ability to contract for other financing in the 
future. She wanted defendant#s agreement that 
either the house would be sold and the debt paid, 
or he would refinance in a manner to discharge the 
existing debt. And the Court of Appeals goes on 
to state "[t]his caused the trial judge to 
separate the granting of the divorce from the 
division of property." The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that the separation occurred as the 
result of a December 30, 1994 order, and this was 
well after the entry of the final decree on 
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November 14, 1994 and therefore ineffective to 
accomplish its stated purpose. Defendant's only 
remedy was by appeal of the November 14 1994 
decree, or by motion to vacate under URCivP 60(b), 
or the trial court to proceed under URCivP 60(a) 
to include the allegedly omitted matter in the 
November 14, 1994 decree. 
2. The Court of Appeals then states "[f]or 
the doctrine [of res judicata] to apply, the 
November 14, 1994, decree must have finally 
resolved all issues between the parties." 
(citations omitted). "On its face, it is clear 
that the decree did not resolve all of the 
issues." In order for an issue to be finally 
resolved, as the Court requires, is it necessary 
that that the court in question affirmatively deal 
with the matter at hand; or can it, by leaving 
things as they are, accomplish its purpose? In 
this case, then, where the trial court intended 
that each party have his or her one-half interest 
in the house, for there to be a resolution, must 
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the trial court decree an already vested interest? 
In addition, res judicata operates not only on 
issues litigated and ruled upon, but also on 
issues that could have been litigated but were 
not. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59 
(Utah App. 1993). If In re Covington, 888 P. 2d 
675 (Utah App. 1994) cited by the Court of Appeals 
is to the contrary it is not the law in Utah 
because it would be in contradiction to Utah 
Supreme Court cases some of which are cited in 
Schoney, supra. 
WHEREFORE, plantiff-appellant prays that 
Memorandum Decision (Not For Official 
Publication), liled September 14, 199b, be vacated 
and the decree of the trial court appealed herein 
reversed. 
DATED October 2, 1995. 
)6^U^-/h^ — 
HEIDI METCALF 
Plaintiff-Appellant Pro Se 
603 North West Capitol Blvd 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
801 359 2833 
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On October 2 1995 true copy of the foregoing 
mailed to Gregory Wall, #800 Boston Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
HEIDI METCALF 
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